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RE: [xacml] request's attribute assertion lifetime?

  • 1.  RE: [xacml] request's attribute assertion lifetime?

    Posted 03-15-2004 21:58
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    Subject: RE: [xacml] request's attribute assertion lifetime?


    Why all this intricate, convoluted way of adding completely unneeded
    information into the context (Not all policies care about time)
    When the problem is (almost trivially) solved by a combination of
    existing solutions:
    
    1) Context handler will return INTEDERMINATE for a certificate that is
    invalid for any reason (time is only one, quite narrow, dimension)
    2) Any interval evaluations can be handled either with explicit
    operations, or by introducing a range data type.
    3) If one want an explicit policy for time validity: you can use a
    separate policy, invoked by the context handler to check this validity,
    or introduce all the attribute metadata as part of the context.
    
    In general, sources of context data do NOT have such metadata attached
    to it.  In general, they may have zillion of other criteria to determine
    validity of a data piece: signatures for example.
    
    We do have an explicit, well defined way of dealing with bad data - the
    INDETERMINATE value.
    
    Because, many systems will not have this metadata available, it will
    need to be an optional feature.  Why would we add optional features for
    functionality that can be solved using existing ones?
    
    I think we should maintain a clear separation of handling data and
    handling parametric policy.  PDP is not a good place to deal with
    certificates.
    
    And you still did not show how you would deal with other time dependent
    rules.
    
    For example
    
    GRANT(swim) if 3pm < time < 5pm  AND tide < 1ft.
    
    What is the "isValid" interval for this policy?
    
    Daniel.
    
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Frank Siebenlist [mailto:franks@mcs.anl.gov] 
    Sent: Monday, March 15, 2004 1:54 PM
    To: Polar Humenn
    Cc: Anne.Anderson@Sun.COM; XACML TC
    Subject: Re: [xacml] request's attribute assertion lifetime?
    
    Ok, thinking about it some more, I don't believe the problem is *that*
    obscure ...
    
    Polar Humenn wrote:
    
    > If you take the approach that all attributes have validity intervals,
    then
    > they may have many validity intervals. Hmmm, how about the Cantor set?
    
    ... and definitely not a Cantor Set like problem ... which I take to be
    some 
    attempt of humor by a (perverted) mathematician ... ;-)
    
    > Furthermore, which "valid" and "invalid" attributes do you include in
    the
    > Request? How old? How new? How long?
    > 
    > For instance, the Request Handler would have to have some special
    concept
    > of time, and for what the PDP access decision is expeciting of
    > access-time, so it can supply the right valid (or currently yet to be
    > valid), attributes to supply.
    > 
    > Where do you draw the line?
    
    The drawing of the line seems pretty straight forward:
    
    We have our repository of all the attribute and authorization policy
    assertions, 
    and each single one of them has a simple validity time interval
    associated with 
    it, like notValidBefore-notValidAfter.
    
    The request context is enriched with an access time interval: 
    noAccessBefore-noAccessAfter.
    
    The PDP handler will now divide the access control decision up in
    sub-intervals 
    that are determined by the overlapping certificate intervals, where each
    
    sub-interval will include all the relevant certs that are valid within
    that time 
    interval.
    
    If all authorization decisions for all the sub-intervals yield Permit,
    then the 
    overall decision for the access time interval yields permit.
    Otherwise... (you 
    fill in the truth table...).
    
    The real issues only seem to occur if you add policy specific time
    dependencies, 
    which can make deterministic evaluation "difficult". To deal with the 
    straightforward time intervals of certificate validity seems trivial.
    
    (... and as long as the handful of applicable assertions doesn't
    approach 
    infinity, the Cantor Set issue doesn't seem to come in play...)
    
    So maybe the problem is not related to "simple" certificate validity
    time 
    intervals, but only in the use of time in the policy rules, which is
    something 
    that WSPL tries to deal with. In other words, if WSPL can show us or
    prescribe 
    how to deal with time intervals in policy rules, we should be ok for
    assertions.
    
    -Frank.
    
    
    
    > On Mon, 15 Mar 2004, Frank Siebenlist wrote:
    > 
    > 
    >>Ann just beat me to it ... while trying to make the equivalent point
    about
    >>WSPL's capabilities, I checked my email one more time ... it must have
    something
    >>to do with those great minds and such ;-)
    >>
    >>The use case that I've brought up a number of times on different
    occasions is
    >>that scheduler application that is running scenarios of service
    invocation
    >>requests where it tries to match-up different resource availabilities.
    For these
    >>scenarios, the authorization decision query is not about a single
    point in time,
    >>but for a time interval: "Is the requester allowed to make use of the
    resource
    >>from T1 till T2?".
    >>
    >>Furthermore, as I tried to argue before, decisions for a single time T
    are not
    >>very useful in practice and we rely on unspoken, implicit
    time-intervals for
    >>which we assume the validity of that decision.
    >>This simplification works well if the time interval between decision
    and
    >>enforcement are "small" (seconds-minutes) compared to the validity
    times
    >>associated with the assertions used (days-months-years).
    >>
    >>In our grid applications, we already work with
    identity/attribute/authorization
    >>assertions that have lifetimes of hours. This will most certainly
    overlap with
    >>the time intervals used for the scenario testing.
    >>
    >>The other advantage is of course caching of authorization decision
    results. If
    >>we have a good way to reason about the time validity of results as
    they relate
    >>to the associated time validity of the assertions these results are
    based on,
    >>then we might be able to reuse those decisions without having to go
    through a
    >>potentially expensive reevaluation.
    >>
    >>-Frank.
    >>
    >>
    >>Anne Anderson wrote:
    >>
    >>
    >>>WSPL also provides a way to tackle the problem of intervals.  Let
    >>>X be the attribute about which interval-type questions are
    >>>asked.  It might be a milepost on a road, a time of day, etc.
    >>>Assume the Resource Accessor's policy says "X >= 5 AND X <= 8".
    >>>
    >>>1) If the Resource Protector's policy says "X >= 2 AND X <= 9",
    >>>   then the merged policy says "X=> 5 AND X <= 8", indicating
    >>>   that the Resource Accessor's entire range is acceptable.
    >>>2) If the Resource Protector's policy says "X >= 6 AND X <= 9",
    >>>   then the merged policy says "X >= 6 AND X <= 8", indicating
    >>>   that only part of the Resource Accessor's desired range is
    >>>   acceptable.
    >>>3) If the Resource Protector's policy says "X >= 1 AND X <= 4",
    >>>   then the merged policy is empty, indicating the Resource
    >>>   Accessor's desired range is completely unacceptable.
    >>>
    >>>The Resource Accessor in the WSPL case doesn't get a simple
    >>>"Permit" or "Deny" answer, but perhaps this more complex result
    >>>is appropriate for the more complex concept of intervals.
    >>>
    >>>Anne
    >>>
    >>>On 15 March, Polar Humenn writes: Re: [xacml] request's attribute
    assertion lifetime?
    >>> > From: Polar Humenn <polar@syr.edu>
    >>> > To: Frank Siebenlist <franks@mcs.anl.gov>
    >>> > Cc: Daniel Engovatov <dengovatov@bea.com>, XACML TC
    <xacml@lists.oasis-open.org>
    >>> > Subject: Re: [xacml] request's attribute assertion lifetime?
    >>> > Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 10:28:44 -0500 (EST)
    >>> >
    >>> >
    >>> > Greetings,
    >>> >
    >>> > Spring Break is over, I am back :)
    >>> >
    >>> > On Wed, 10 Mar 2004, Frank Siebenlist wrote:
    >>> >
    >>> > > [snip]
    >>> >
    >>> > > Time is different than any other attribute as it moves in
    predictable ways. This
    >>> > > is not a philosophical observation but is truly used.
    >>> >
    >>> > True, which is exactly why we shouldn't go diving into throwing
    XML
    >>> > attributes around to solve a complicated problem without major
    study.
    >>> >
    >>> > XACML presently defines access control on attributes assumed to be
    valid,
    >>> > whether that validity is based on time, issuer, signatures, which
    is all
    >>> > up to the Request Handler. Admittedly, we do not have a
    specification for
    >>> > the Request Handler (of which I think Daniel would like).
    >>> >
    >>> > I can forsee, however, some form of XACML to handle the problem of
    >>> > intervals, but if needed, as an extension, and only after
    significant
    >>> > research in the area. Please keep in mind that intervals not only
    apply to
    >>> > time. For instance, "Is Alice allowed on section of road R between
    points
    >>> > A and B?"
    >>> >
    >>> > We may tackle this problem by forming a specific committee to
    study the
    >>> > issue for Intervals Based XACML or some such thingy. There is a
    lot of
    >>> > research in temporal logics and such that may be helpful. However,
    I would
    >>> > like to see a significant interest in the subject and commitment
    to study
    >>> > before we attempt to solve one small use case, which can be solved
    by
    >>> > formulating attributes in the way that Daniel described.
    >>> >
    >>> > Cheers,
    >>> > -Polar
    >>> >
    >>> > To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the
    roster of the OASIS TC), go to
    http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/xacml/members/leave_workgro
    up.php.
    >>> >
    >>>
    >>--
    >>Frank Siebenlist               franks@mcs.anl.gov
    >>The Globus Alliance - Argonne National Laboratory
    >>
    > 
    > 
    > To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the roster
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    up.php.
    > 
    
    -- 
    Frank Siebenlist               franks@mcs.anl.gov
    The Globus Alliance - Argonne National Laboratory
    
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