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Groups - OASIS ebXML Messaging Services Version 3.0: Part 2, Advanced Features (v46) (ebMS3-part2-V49.odt) uploaded

  • 1.  Groups - OASIS ebXML Messaging Services Version 3.0: Part 2, Advanced Features (v46) (ebMS3-part2-V49.odt) uploaded

    Posted 01-20-2010 00:08
    All,
    
    in this version I edited section 2.8 to reflect the results of our
    discussions based on my earlier comments. One of them was that the PMode
    migration was not completed defined. 
    While editing I found it is more logical to first define the general
    concept of PMode units and the requirements on their alignment and then
    explain how to migrate. Therefore I changed the order of sections 2.8.2 and
    2.8.3. 
    Current section 2.8.3 on migration also still needs to be completed. I was
    also wondering if it should be in the spec altogether as it is more an
    informative section than a normative one. Maybe it is better moved to an
    appendix?
    
    In this version I also made some editorial changes to section 2.9 and added
    some question / comments on sections 2.9 till 3.2 which I repeat below.
    
    Regards,
    Sander
    
    2.9:
    In this section WS-SecureConversation is mentioned several times and also
    new PMode parameters are defined for it. WS-SecureConversation is however
    not mentioned in the Core spec. So it seems out of scope for ebMS V3. Why
    is it then introduced here in the context of multi-hop?
    
    When it is needed do the new PMode suffice to complete configure
    WS-SecureConversation?
    
    3.2.1:
    On line 1839 (changes shown) I assume wsu:Timestamp should be
    wsu:Timestamp/wsu:Created ?  
    
    To me the intention of the list on how a one-way user message can be
    bundled with another message (lines 1845-1850) is unclear. It seems that
    the message can be bundled with any message flowing in the same direction.
    Also why is this list limited to one-was user messages?
    
    Also the statements on lines 1851-1853 are not specific to bundling and I
    don't see what their relevance is here.
    
    3.2.2:
    Which PMode is intended in the second bullet on the configuration of
    receipts? Based on the remark on non-repudation of receipt above the
    bullets I would assume the PMode governing the message unit (not
    necessarily the PMode of the primary unit). 
    
    If the receipt covers more than the original message is it then still a
    valid receipt?
    
    When the configuration of the primary PMode is used to sign the receipt and
    the certificates of the primary PMode and the secondary PMode differ, is
    the receipt still a valid receipt?     
    
          
    
    
     -- Mr. Sander Fieten
    
    The document revision named OASIS ebXML Messaging Services Version 3.0:
    Part 2, Advanced Features (v46) (ebMS3-part2-V49.odt) has been submitted by
    Mr. Sander Fieten to the OASIS ebXML Messaging Services TC document
    repository.  This document is revision #19 of ebMS3-part2-V32-JD.odt.
    
    Document Description:
    
    
    View Document Details:
    http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=35993
    
    Download Document:  
    http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/35993/ebMS3-part2-V49.odt
    
    Revision:
    This document is revision #19 of ebMS3-part2-V32-JD.odt.  The document
    details page referenced above will show the complete revision history.
    
    
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  • 2.  RE: [ebxml-msg] Groups - OASIS ebXML Messaging Services Version 3.0: Part 2, Advanced Features (v46) (ebMS3-part2-V49.odt) uploaded

    Posted 01-20-2010 08:20
    Hello,
    
    On 2.9:  WS-SecureConversation is not mentioned in the Core
    Spec, but it is becoming more widely used and is in the WS-I
    profiles.  Other messaging frameworks are adopting it, so I
    think ebMS should provide support for it.  Perhaps it should
    have its own (very short) chapter rather than be a
    subsection of the multi-hop draft.
    
    On 3.2.1:  
    Yes, it should be wsu:Timestamp/wsu:Created
    
    The list for one way is an example. The point this is making
    that one way and (legs of) two way exchanges can be mixed.
    
    The statements in lines 1851-1853 are there to show that all
    cross references are at message unit level. There is no
    identity for the bundle.  It does not specify anything new
    as it follows from the way bundling is set to work, but
    apparently this was not immediately clear to every reader. 
    
    On 3.2.2:
    Message signing is handled at the WS-Security level.
    Receipt generation is handled at the ebMS level. This
    explains the different handling of message signing and
    receipt signing in bundles.
    
    The goal is that at WS-Security level there is no
    implementation difference between sending a message with
    just one user message unit (and its payloads) and a bundle
    with any added secondary units (and their payloads).  This
    way we avoid any conflicts between Pmodes of units (they may
    both want to encrypt the SOAP Body, but with different
    keys), and can use existing WS-Security modules (perhaps
    configured using WS-Security policy) with no or minimal
    changes. This means just one Signature which (if it is to
    sign the payloads) signs all payloads, not just some.  This
    greatly simplifies the bundling protocol (and people on the
    TC have been stressing simplification, so I guess this is
    important).
    
    At ebMS level, we have access to the Pmodes of the
    individual user message units.  So to sign the receipt, we
    can use different keys, if the Pmodes specify different
    keys.    The key requirement for non-repudidation is that
    the UserMessage and its payloads are covered by the receipt
    signature.  For ease of implementation (and ease of
    implementation is a requirement), an implementation may just
    want to reuse the ds:References from the received message
    (validated by the WS-Security module), instead of re-hashing
    the relevant parts (and finding out what those parts are).
    Since the WS-Security module may have signed more than just
    the parts, the receipt may include more than what is
    strictly needed.   The ebBP receipt has references to all
    parts and their hashes, and they are included in the
    signature, so my assumption is that this is a valid receipt.
    
    
    Pim