OASIS ebXML Messaging Services TC

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RE: Threat assessment, some dissent RE: [ebxml-msg] security pro blemwith ebXML MS

  • 1.  RE: Threat assessment, some dissent RE: [ebxml-msg] security pro blemwith ebXML MS

    Posted 11-09-2001 23:36
    
    Suresh,
    
    You asked "What if another type contract is used?"  That might be another
    can of worms but I think that we can safely put it off until version 77
    since no other such contract has surfaced and Web Services hasn't yet
    figured out the need for agreements.  So, we are dealing with the following
    cases:
    
       CPA
    
       Manually entered configuration information equivalent to a CPA but with
       no automated assurance that what both parties enter is compatible. I
       think that this is what most of us understand as the meaning of "no
       CPA".
    
       No agreement at all.
    
    The proponents of "no agreement at all"  either believe that two parties
    can communicate without compatible configurations or that all the
    configuration information can be carried in the message header.
    
    
    Regards,
    Marty
    *************************************************************************************
    
    Martin W. Sachs
    IBM T. J. Watson Research Center
    P. O. B. 704
    Yorktown Hts, NY 10598
    914-784-7287;  IBM tie line 863-7287
    Notes address:  Martin W Sachs/Watson/IBM
    Internet address:  mwsachs @ us.ibm.com
    *************************************************************************************
    
    
    
    "Damodaran, Suresh" <Suresh_Damodaran@stercomm.com> on 11/09/2001 05:33:48
    PM
    
    To:    "'Dale Moberg'" <dmoberg@cyclonecommerce.com>, James M Galvin
           <galvin@drummondgroup.com>, Christopher Ferris
           <chris.ferris@sun.com>, Rich Salz <rsalz@zolera.com>
    cc:    ebxml-msg@lists.oasis-open.org
    Subject:    RE: Threat assessment,  some dissent RE: [ebxml-msg] security
           pro  blem with ebXML MS
    
    
    
    Dale,
    
    In any case, the MS spec should state clearly what
    kind of security it supports and what it doesn't.
    It definitely is not in the interest of anyone
    to say that ebXML MS provides certain security guarantees,
    when it doesn't. Possibly the security considerations
    section needs a good rewrite, may be other too.
    (Things like CPA will have Content-Type should be in MS spec.
    However, I am not sure MS assumes the uses a CPA.
    What if another type contract is used? Hope I am
    not opening another can of worms:-))
    
    I do hope this subject gets discussed at the F2F.
    
    Regards,
    -Suresh
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Dale Moberg [mailto:dmoberg@cyclonecommerce.com]
    Sent: Friday, November 09, 2001 12:27 PM
    To: Damodaran, Suresh; James M Galvin; Christopher Ferris; Rich Salz
    Cc: ebxml-msg@lists.oasis-open.org
    Subject: RE: Threat assessment, some dissent RE: [ebxml-msg] security
    problem with ebXML MS
    
    
    Jim and Suresh,
    
    In my earlier long message I tried to summarize:
    
    1. what kind of threats
    might be provided
    2. under what transport/packaging conditions
    given the typical processing of
    3. ebXML messages.
    
    I considered a number of possible kinds
    of threats. Apparently Jim thinks it
    is only the threat of misdirection that
    should be of concern. So,
    
    for that threat, these considerations still
    stand:
    
    1. ebXML messaging processing does
    not need to trust internal MIME content-type
    values.
    2. content-id values, if changed, will almost
    certainly lead to an error condition when
    they are used as part of XMLDsig signatures.
    3. CPA based agreements can be used to:
     a. check that internal mime content-types
        are as expected. MIME error can be thrown
        if enforced.
     b. add digital enveloping that can encrypt the entire
         MIME chunk, including the headers
        (using 1847 security packaging if you like, Jim!)
    
    Given all of this existing apparatus permitting
    strong counters for the situation of MITM header
    tweaking, if you still wish to mandate an
    additional new security mechanism, I urged you
    to hold off until the next iteration. By then,
    maybe XMLEncryption will be stable or other
    security proposals may have emerged that can
    be cited. Maybe a tweak to the mid: or cid: URIs
    that would permit mid: sub-segments-- who knows?
    
    ebXML messaging is IMO not primarily engaged in
    inventing new security solutions and countermeasures,
    but instead is involved in adopting
    existing stable solutions to achieve
    an acceptable coverage for the standard threats
    (spoofing, alteration, and sniffing).
    I would rather retrofit to a dedicated
    security groups carefully examined spec.
    than try to throw something together at the last minute
    (and we are at the last minute for 1.1).
    
    Dale
    
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