OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) TC

Expand all | Collapse all

Next Face 2 Face

Sean Barnum

Sean Barnum02-05-2016 17:49

  • 1.  Next Face 2 Face

    Posted 01-28-2016 17:41
    Based on the discussion on today's TC wide call, I would like to propose that we adopt: 1) a 6 month cadence for full 2-3 day Face 2 Face events.   1a) where it makes sense, follow these full F2F events with public training / briefing events 2) regular regional training events that could double as mini-1 day / half day F2F meetings   I would like to propose the following schedule as a straw man. May-June 2016  -  Training / Briefing  - Washington DC Area Aug-Sept 2016 -  Face2Face  - London / Belgium / Amsterdam with a Training / Briefing  either before or after the F2F (piggy back on the travel) for NATO, EuroPOL, ENISA, etc Oct-Nov 2016 -  Training / Briefing  - San Francisco, CA / Bay Area March 2017 -  Face2Face  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia with a Training / Briefing  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia (piggy back on the travel) for (yet to be identified government groups, companies, etc) May-June 2017 - Training/Briefing - TBD possible options (Seattle Washington Area or maybe Canada) Aug-Sept 2017 -  Face2Face  - Washington DC Area with a Training / Briefing  either before of after the F2F for the Washington DC area people.  Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.   Attachment: signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail


  • 2.  RE: Next Face 2 Face

    Posted 01-28-2016 17:47
    I agree with this proposal, but wouldn’t be against adding additional satellite events – I’d host one in Charlotte or I bet we could find someone to host in Atlanta.   Perhaps it would be good to align our events with other widely attended security conferences if possible, like we’re doing with RSA?   Thanks,   Alex   From: cti@lists.oasis-open.org [mailto:cti@lists.oasis-open.org] On Behalf Of Jordan, Bret Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 12:41 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject: [cti] Next Face 2 Face   Based on the discussion on today's TC wide call, I would like to propose that we adopt:   1) a 6 month cadence for full 2-3 day Face 2 Face events.                 1a) where it makes sense, follow these full F2F events with public training / briefing events   2) regular regional training events that could double as mini-1 day / half day F2F meetings         I would like to propose the following schedule as a straw man.     May-June 2016  -  Training / Briefing  - Washington DC Area   Aug-Sept 2016 -  Face2Face  - London / Belgium / Amsterdam with a Training / Briefing  either before or after the F2F (piggy back on the travel) for NATO, EuroPOL, ENISA, etc   Oct-Nov 2016 -  Training / Briefing  - San Francisco, CA / Bay Area   March 2017 -  Face2Face  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia with a Training / Briefing  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia (piggy back on the travel) for (yet to be identified government groups, companies, etc)   May-June 2017 - Training/Briefing - TBD possible options (Seattle Washington Area or maybe Canada)   Aug-Sept 2017 -  Face2Face  - Washington DC Area with a Training / Briefing  either before of after the F2F for the Washington DC area people.      Thanks,   Bret       Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."    This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.bankofamerica.com/emaildisclaimer. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message.


  • 3.  Re: [cti] RE: Next Face 2 Face

    Posted 01-28-2016 19:45
    I think the most obvious conference to tailgate on is the annual FIRST assembly. Cheers, Trey -- Trey Darley Senior Security Engineer Soltra An FS-ISAC & DTCC Company +32/494.766.080 trey@soltra.com www.soltra.com ++----------------------------------------------------------------------------++ Sent from my CRM-114 Discriminator On Jan 28, 2016 18:47, "Foley, Alexander - GIS" <alexander.foley@bankofamerica.com> wrote: I agree with this proposal, but wouldn’t be against adding additional satellite events – I’d host one in Charlotte or I bet we could find someone to host in Atlanta.   Perhaps it would be good to align our events with other widely attended security conferences if possible, like we’re doing with RSA?   Thanks,   Alex   From: cti@lists.oasis-open.org [mailto:cti@lists.oasis-open.org] On Behalf Of Jordan, Bret Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 12:41 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject: [cti] Next Face 2 Face   Based on the discussion on today's TC wide call, I would like to propose that we adopt:   1) a 6 month cadence for full 2-3 day Face 2 Face events.                 1a) where it makes sense, follow these full F2F events with public training / briefing events   2) regular regional training events that could double as mini-1 day / half day F2F meetings         I would like to propose the following schedule as a straw man.     May-June 2016  -  Training / Briefing  - Washington DC Area   Aug-Sept 2016 -  Face2Face  - London / Belgium / Amsterdam with a Training / Briefing  either before or after the F2F (piggy back on the travel) for NATO, EuroPOL, ENISA, etc   Oct-Nov 2016 -  Training / Briefing  - San Francisco, CA / Bay Area   March 2017 -  Face2Face  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia with a Training / Briefing  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia (piggy back on the travel) for (yet to be identified government groups, companies, etc)   May-June 2017 - Training/Briefing - TBD possible options (Seattle Washington Area or maybe Canada)   Aug-Sept 2017 -  Face2Face  - Washington DC Area with a Training / Briefing  either before of after the F2F for the Washington DC area people.      Thanks,   Bret       Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."    This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.bankofamerica.com/emaildisclaimer. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message.


  • 4.  Re: [cti] RE: Next Face 2 Face

    Posted 01-28-2016 19:58
    I'd like to see some simultaneous hack-a-thon happening, for those of us who are more comfortable with code commits than Powerpoint presentations. JSA From: cti@lists.oasis-open.org <cti@lists.oasis-open.org> on behalf of Trey Darley <trey@soltra.com> Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 2:44 PM To: Foley, Alexander - GIS Cc: Bret Jordan; cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject: Re: [cti] RE: Next Face 2 Face   I think the most obvious conference to tailgate on is the annual FIRST assembly. Cheers, Trey -- Trey Darley Senior Security Engineer Soltra An FS-ISAC & DTCC Company +32/494.766.080 trey@soltra.com www.soltra.com ++----------------------------------------------------------------------------++ Sent from my CRM-114 Discriminator On Jan 28, 2016 18:47, "Foley, Alexander - GIS" <alexander.foley@bankofamerica.com> wrote: I agree with this proposal, but wouldn’t be against adding additional satellite events – I’d host one in Charlotte or I bet we could find someone to host in Atlanta.   Perhaps it would be good to align our events with other widely attended security conferences if possible, like we’re doing with RSA?   Thanks,   Alex   From: cti@lists.oasis-open.org [mailto:cti@lists.oasis-open.org] On Behalf Of Jordan, Bret Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 12:41 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject: [cti] Next Face 2 Face   Based on the discussion on today's TC wide call, I would like to propose that we adopt:   1) a 6 month cadence for full 2-3 day Face 2 Face events.                 1a) where it makes sense, follow these full F2F events with public training / briefing events   2) regular regional training events that could double as mini-1 day / half day F2F meetings         I would like to propose the following schedule as a straw man.     May-June 2016  -  Training / Briefing  - Washington DC Area   Aug-Sept 2016 -  Face2Face  - London / Belgium / Amsterdam with a Training / Briefing  either before or after the F2F (piggy back on the travel) for NATO, EuroPOL, ENISA, etc   Oct-Nov 2016 -  Training / Briefing  - San Francisco, CA / Bay Area   March 2017 -  Face2Face  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia with a Training / Briefing  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia (piggy back on the travel) for (yet to be identified government groups, companies, etc)   May-June 2017 - Training/Briefing - TBD possible options (Seattle Washington Area or maybe Canada)   Aug-Sept 2017 -  Face2Face  - Washington DC Area with a Training / Briefing  either before of after the F2F for the Washington DC area people.      Thanks,   Bret       Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."    This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.bankofamerica.com/emaildisclaimer. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message.


  • 5.  Re: [cti] Next Face 2 Face

    Posted 01-28-2016 20:30
    If we do this right, then it is possible for us to have a F2F where we do design work, trainings/briefing where we help people that are not in OASIS come up to speed, and do a half-day / full day user / developer session.  I could actually see this turning in to a 4-5 day event.   Day 1 = Briefings for Executives and Governments Day 2 - 3 = Face 2 Face Day 4 = Training for Users, Analysts, and Developers Day 5 = Developer hack-a-thon where community get to meet with the groups doing the work and collaborate on open source development efforts.   Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.   On Jan 28, 2016, at 12:57, John Anderson < janderson@soltra.com > wrote: I'd like to see some simultaneous hack-a-thon happening, for those of us who are more comfortable with code commits than Powerpoint presentations. JSA From:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Trey Darley < trey@soltra.com > Sent:   Thursday, January 28, 2016 2:44 PM To:   Foley, Alexander - GIS Cc:   Bret Jordan; cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject:   Re: [cti] RE: Next Face 2 Face   I think the most obvious conference to tailgate on is the annual FIRST assembly. Cheers, Trey -- Trey Darley Senior Security Engineer Soltra An FS-ISAC & DTCC Company +32/494.766.080 trey@soltra.com www.soltra.com ++----------------------------------------------------------------------------++ Sent from my CRM-114 Discriminator On Jan 28, 2016 18:47, Foley, Alexander - GIS < alexander.foley@bankofamerica.com > wrote: I agree with this proposal, but wouldn’t be against adding additional satellite events – I’d host one in Charlotte or I bet we could find someone to host in Atlanta.   Perhaps it would be good to align our events with other widely attended security conferences if possible, like we’re doing with RSA?   Thanks,   Alex   From:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org [ mailto:cti@lists.oasis-open.org ]   On Behalf Of   Jordan, Bret Sent:   Thursday, January 28, 2016 12:41 PM To:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject:   [cti] Next Face 2 Face   Based on the discussion on today's TC wide call, I would like to propose that we adopt:   1) a 6 month cadence for full 2-3 day Face 2 Face events.                   1a) where it makes sense, follow these full F2F events with public training / briefing events   2) regular regional training events that could double as mini-1 day / half day F2F meetings         I would like to propose the following schedule as a straw man.     May-June 2016  -  Training / Briefing  - Washington DC Area   Aug-Sept 2016 -  Face2Face  - London / Belgium / Amsterdam with a   Training / Briefing  either before or after the F2F (piggy back on the travel) for NATO, EuroPOL, ENISA, etc   Oct-Nov 2016 -  Training / Briefing  - San Francisco, CA / Bay Area   March 2017 -  Face2Face  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia with a   Training / Briefing  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia (piggy back on the travel) for (yet to be identified government groups, companies, etc)   May-June 2017 -   Training/Briefing   - TBD possible options (Seattle Washington Area or maybe Canada)   Aug-Sept 2017 -  Face2Face  - Washington DC Area with a   Training / Briefing  either before of after the F2F for the Washington DC area people.      Thanks,   Bret       Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.     This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.bankofamerica.com/emaildisclaimer . If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message. Attachment: signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail


  • 6.  Re: [cti] Next Face 2 Face

    Posted 02-02-2016 19:54
    Can I make a request that every training that takes place regarding STIX/TAXII/CybOX specifically mention/provide training on the STIX validator? We have had several different instances where people attempt to share information with us in STIX format, but the STIX doesn’t validate so we can’t actually use what they’re sending us. Thanks, Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of "Jordan, Bret" < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com > Date: Thursday, January 28, 2016 at 3:30 PM To: John Anderson < janderson@soltra.com > Cc: Trey Darley < trey@soltra.com >, "Foley, Alexander - GIS" < alexander.foley@bankofamerica.com >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Next Face 2 Face If we do this right, then it is possible for us to have a F2F where we do design work, trainings/briefing where we help people that are not in OASIS come up to speed, and do a half-day / full day user / developer session.  I could actually see this turning in to a 4-5 day event.   Day 1 = Briefings for Executives and Governments Day 2 - 3 = Face 2 Face Day 4 = Training for Users, Analysts, and Developers Day 5 = Developer hack-a-thon where community get to meet with the groups doing the work and collaborate on open source development efforts.   Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."  On Jan 28, 2016, at 12:57, John Anderson < janderson@soltra.com > wrote: I'd like to see some simultaneous hack-a-thon happening, for those of us who are more comfortable with code commits than Powerpoint presentations. JSA From:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Trey Darley < trey@soltra.com > Sent:   Thursday, January 28, 2016 2:44 PM To:   Foley, Alexander - GIS Cc:   Bret Jordan; cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject:   Re: [cti] RE: Next Face 2 Face   I think the most obvious conference to tailgate on is the annual FIRST assembly. Cheers, Trey -- Trey Darley Senior Security Engineer Soltra An FS-ISAC & DTCC Company +32/494.766.080 trey@soltra.com www.soltra.com ++----------------------------------------------------------------------------++ Sent from my CRM-114 Discriminator On Jan 28, 2016 18:47, "Foley, Alexander - GIS" < alexander.foley@bankofamerica.com > wrote: I agree with this proposal, but wouldn’t be against adding additional satellite events – I’d host one in Charlotte or I bet we could find someone to host in Atlanta.   Perhaps it would be good to align our events with other widely attended security conferences if possible, like we’re doing with RSA?   Thanks,   Alex   From:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org [ mailto:cti@lists.oasis-open.org ]   On Behalf Of   Jordan, Bret Sent:   Thursday, January 28, 2016 12:41 PM To:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject:   [cti] Next Face 2 Face   Based on the discussion on today's TC wide call, I would like to propose that we adopt:   1) a 6 month cadence for full 2-3 day Face 2 Face events.                   1a) where it makes sense, follow these full F2F events with public training / briefing events   2) regular regional training events that could double as mini-1 day / half day F2F meetings         I would like to propose the following schedule as a straw man.     May-June 2016  -  Training / Briefing  - Washington DC Area   Aug-Sept 2016 -  Face2Face  - London / Belgium / Amsterdam with a   Training / Briefing  either before or after the F2F (piggy back on the travel) for NATO, EuroPOL, ENISA, etc   Oct-Nov 2016 -  Training / Briefing  - San Francisco, CA / Bay Area   March 2017 -  Face2Face  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia with a   Training / Briefing  - Tokyo, Japan / Australia (piggy back on the travel) for (yet to be identified government groups, companies, etc)   May-June 2017 -   Training/Briefing   - TBD possible options (Seattle Washington Area or maybe Canada)   Aug-Sept 2017 -  Face2Face  - Washington DC Area with a   Training / Briefing  either before of after the F2F for the Washington DC area people.      Thanks,   Bret       Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."    This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.bankofamerica.com/emaildisclaimer . If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message. This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . .


  • 7.  Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-04-2016 11:21
    In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs are wrong, or the validator is wrong? On Feb 2, 2016, at 2:53 PM, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > wrote: Can I make a request that every training that takes place regarding STIX/TAXII/CybOX specifically mention/provide training on the STIX validator? We have had several different instances where people attempt to share information with us in STIX format, but the STIX doesn’t validate so we can’t actually use what they’re sending us. Attachment: smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature


  • 8.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-04-2016 13:50
    Furthermore - are the people creating this STIX using a tool provided by a vendor, or crafting it by hand (or using home grown tools). - Jason Keirstead STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems www.ibm.com/security www.securityintelligence.com Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown Eric Burger ---02/04/2016 07:20:43 AM---In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs a From: Eric Burger <Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu> To: Sarah Kelley <Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org> Cc: "cti@lists.oasis-open.org" <cti@lists.oasis-open.org> Date: 02/04/2016 07:20 AM Subject: [cti] Quality of the specs Sent by: <cti@lists.oasis-open.org> In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs are wrong, or the validator is wrong?
    On Feb 2, 2016, at 2:53 PM, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > wrote: Can I make a request that every training that takes place regarding STIX/TAXII/CybOX specifically mention/provide training on the STIX validator? We have had several different instances where people attempt to share information with us in STIX format, but the STIX doesn’t validate so we can’t actually use what they’re sending us.




  • 9.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-04-2016 14:03
    Unfortunately, I can’t say with 100% certainty. The STIX documents were sent via email, so I don’t have a clue what created the documents from a tool perspective.  I feel like some of it is that people are just taking liberties with the language. For example, one error I just got when trying to validate a file said: “The value ‘Domain Name’ is not an element of the set {‘FQDN’, ‘TLD’}” This says to me, and I could just be wrong, that someone implemented something that didn’t like the options of FQDN or TLD, so they just put Domain Name there instead.  However, some of the problems might be just an issue reading/interpreting the specs. I have also seen the error: “Element ‘{ http://stix.mitre.org/stix-1 }Handling’ is not a member of…” however “{ http://stix.mitre.org/Indicator-2}Handling ” is one of the options in the list. Since I’m an analyst and not a spec writer or a tool developer, this error doesn’t mean much to me, but it might mean something to others.  Sorry I can’t provide more specifics, but I really don’t know how these documents were generated.  Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:48 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Cc: Sarah Kelley < sarah.kelley@cisecurity.org >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Furthermore - are the people creating this STIX using a tool provided by a vendor, or crafting it by hand (or using home grown tools). - Jason Keirstead STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems www.ibm.com/security www.securityintelligence.com Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown Eric Burger ---02/04/2016 07:20:43 AM---In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs a From: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > To: Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Cc: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Date: 02/04/2016 07:20 AM Subject: [cti] Quality of the specs Sent by: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs are wrong, or the validator is wrong? On Feb 2, 2016, at 2:53 PM, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > wrote: Can I make a request that every training that takes place regarding STIX/TAXII/CybOX specifically mention/provide training on the STIX validator? We have had several different instances where people attempt to share information with us in STIX format, but the STIX doesn’t validate so we can’t actually use what they’re sending us. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . .


  • 10.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-04-2016 14:16
    I can't speak for your threat sharing list or how it works - but if I was receiving things like that, I would start replying to the originator saying the document was invalid and asking for it to be re-sent... if you don't tell them its broken then they'll never fix it. I presume at some point the STIX it is coming from a tool - either written by an internal group, or an external vendor - regardless, there is some party that they should push on to fix the problem. Recipients of STIX shouldn't have to worry about it being constantly invalid... it gives the whole effort a black eye... maybe a good topic for the Interoperability working group. - Jason Keirstead STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems www.ibm.com/security www.securityintelligence.com Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown Sarah Kelley ---02/04/2016 10:02:58 AM---Unfortunately, I can’t say with 100% certainty. The STIX documents were sent via email, so I don’t h From: Sarah Kelley <Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org> To: "cti@lists.oasis-open.org" <cti@lists.oasis-open.org> Date: 02/04/2016 10:02 AM Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Sent by: <cti@lists.oasis-open.org> Unfortunately, I can’t say with 100% certainty. The STIX documents were sent via email, so I don’t have a clue what created the documents from a tool perspective. I feel like some of it is that people are just taking liberties with the language. For example, one error I just got when trying to validate a file said: “The value ‘Domain Name’ is not an element of the set {‘FQDN’, ‘TLD’}” This says to me, and I could just be wrong, that someone implemented something that didn’t like the options of FQDN or TLD, so they just put Domain Name there instead. However, some of the problems might be just an issue reading/interpreting the specs. I have also seen the error: “Element ‘{ http://stix.mitre.org/stix-1 }Handling’ is not a member of…” however “{ http://stix.mitre.org/Indicator-2}Handling ” is one of the options in the list. Since I’m an analyst and not a spec writer or a tool developer, this error doesn’t mean much to me, but it might mean something to others. Sorry I can’t provide more specifics, but I really don’t know how these documents were generated. Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email: cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:48 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Cc: Sarah Kelley < sarah.kelley@cisecurity.org >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Furthermore - are the people creating this STIX using a tool provided by a vendor, or crafting it by hand (or using home grown tools). - Jason Keirstead STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems www.ibm.com/security www.securityintelligence.com Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown Eric Burger ---02/04/2016 07:20:43 AM---In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs a From: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > To: Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Cc: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Date: 02/04/2016 07:20 AM Subject: [cti] Quality of the specs Sent by: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs are wrong, or the validator is wrong? On Feb 2, 2016, at 2:53 PM, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > wrote: Can I make a request that every training that takes place regarding STIX/TAXII/CybOX specifically mention/provide training on the STIX validator? We have had several different instances where people attempt to share information with us in STIX format, but the STIX doesn’t validate so we can’t actually use what they’re sending us. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . . --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe from this mail list, you must leave the OASIS TC that generates this mail.  Follow this link to all your TCs in OASIS at: https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/portal/my_workgroups.php   [attachment "graycol.gif" deleted by Jason Keirstead/CanEast/IBM]


  • 11.  Re: [cti-interoperability] Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-04-2016 14:46
    I think Sarah's original point to include a section on Ramrod in STIX training was an excellent one and [+1] her recommendation to add it to the course syllabus. Patrick Maroney President Integrated Networking Technologies, Inc. Desk: (856)983-0001 Cell: (609)841-5104 Email: pmaroney@specere.org On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 6:15 AM -0800, "Jason Keirstead" < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com > wrote: I can't speak for your threat sharing list or how it works - but if I was receiving things like that, I would start replying to the originator saying the document was invalid and asking for it to be re-sent... if you don't tell them its broken then they'll never fix it. I presume at some point the STIX it is coming from a tool - either written by an internal group, or an external vendor - regardless, there is some party that they should push on to fix the problem. Recipients of STIX shouldn't have to worry about it being constantly invalid... it gives the whole effort a black eye... maybe a good topic for the Interoperability working group. - Jason Keirstead STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems www.ibm.com/security www.securityintelligence.com Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown Sarah Kelley ---02/04/2016 10:02:58 AM---Unfortunately, I can’t say with 100% certainty. The STIX documents were sent via email, so I don’t h From: Sarah Kelley <Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org> To: "cti@lists.oasis-open.org" <cti@lists.oasis-open.org> Date: 02/04/2016 10:02 AM Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Sent by: <cti@lists.oasis-open.org> Unfortunately, I can’t say with 100% certainty. The STIX documents were sent via email, so I don’t have a clue what created the documents from a tool perspective. I feel like some of it is that people are just taking liberties with the language. For example, one error I just got when trying to validate a file said: “The value ‘Domain Name’ is not an element of the set {‘FQDN’, ‘TLD’}” This says to me, and I could just be wrong, that someone implemented something that didn’t like the options of FQDN or TLD, so they just put Domain Name there instead. However, some of the problems might be just an issue reading/interpreting the specs. I have also seen the error: “Element ‘{ http://stix.mitre.org/stix-1 }Handling’ is not a member of…” however “{ http://stix.mitre.org/Indicator-2}Handling ” is one of the options in the list. Since I’m an analyst and not a spec writer or a tool developer, this error doesn’t mean much to me, but it might mean something to others. Sorry I can’t provide more specifics, but I really don’t know how these documents were generated. Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email: cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:48 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Cc: Sarah Kelley < sarah.kelley@cisecurity.org >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Furthermore - are the people creating this STIX using a tool provided by a vendor, or crafting it by hand (or using home grown tools). - Jason Keirstead STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems www.ibm.com/security www.securityintelligence.com Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown Eric Burger ---02/04/2016 07:20:43 AM---In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs a From: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > To: Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Cc: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Date: 02/04/2016 07:20 AM Subject: [cti] Quality of the specs Sent by: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs are wrong, or the validator is wrong? On Feb 2, 2016, at 2:53 PM, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > wrote: Can I make a request that every training that takes place regarding STIX/TAXII/CybOX specifically mention/provide training on the STIX validator? We have had several different instances where people attempt to share information with us in STIX format, but the STIX doesn’t validate so we can’t actually use what they’re sending us. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . . --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe from this mail list, you must leave the OASIS TC that generates this mail.  Follow this link to all your TCs in OASIS at: https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/portal/my_workgroups.php   [attachment "graycol.gif" deleted by Jason Keirstead/CanEast/IBM]


  • 12.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-04-2016 22:22
    I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making "useful" STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or "Common usage convention" for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400 office +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile     +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense.   From: cti@lists.oasis-open.org <cti@lists.oasis-open.org> on behalf of Sarah Kelley <Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org> Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 9:02 AM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs   Unfortunately, I can’t say with 100% certainty. The STIX documents were sent via email, so I don’t have a clue what created the documents from a tool perspective.  I feel like some of it is that people are just taking liberties with the language. For example, one error I just got when trying to validate a file said: “The value ‘Domain Name’ is not an element of the set {‘FQDN’, ‘TLD’}” This says to me, and I could just be wrong, that someone implemented something that didn’t like the options of FQDN or TLD, so they just put Domain Name there instead.  However, some of the problems might be just an issue reading/interpreting the specs. I have also seen the error: “Element ‘{ http://stix.mitre.org/stix-1 }Handling’ is not a member of…” however “{ http://stix.mitre.org/Indicator-2}Handling ” is one of the options in the list. Since I’m an analyst and not a spec writer or a tool developer, this error doesn’t mean much to me, but it might mean something to others.  Sorry I can’t provide more specifics, but I really don’t know how these documents were generated.  Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:48 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Cc: Sarah Kelley < sarah.kelley@cisecurity.org >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Furthermore - are the people creating this STIX using a tool provided by a vendor, or crafting it by hand (or using home grown tools). - Jason Keirstead STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems www.ibm.com/security www.securityintelligence.com Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown Eric Burger ---02/04/2016 07:20:43 AM---In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs a From: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > To: Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Cc: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Date: 02/04/2016 07:20 AM Subject: [cti] Quality of the specs Sent by: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs are wrong, or the validator is wrong? On Feb 2, 2016, at 2:53 PM, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > wrote: Can I make a request that every training that takes place regarding STIX/TAXII/CybOX specifically mention/provide training on the STIX validator? We have had several different instances where people attempt to share information with us in STIX format, but the STIX doesn’t validate so we can’t actually use what they’re sending us. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . .


  • 13.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 04:20
    I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide. Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog. Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it. On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote: I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making useful STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or Common usage convention for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense. Attachment: smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature


  • 14.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 12:01




    There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/


    If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled.


    Thank you.
    -Mark








    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs





    I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide.


    Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog.


    Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it.



    On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote:



    I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and
    then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.
     However this rarely lead to them making "useful" STIX however at the first redo. 




    A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates...
    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)
    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead. 
    2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.
    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem)
    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was
    seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim
    Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable
    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.
    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.




    Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or "Common usage convention" for STIX 1.x.

    -Mark











    Mark Clancy
    Chief Executive Officer
    SOLTRA     An
    FS-ISAC and DTCC Company
    +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823
    626 535   UK  mobile
    mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com
     
    One organization's
    incident becomes everyone's defense.


















  • 15.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 12:17
    The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong.  Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way. On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote: There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/ If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled. Thank you. -Mark From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide. Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog. Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it. On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote: I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making useful STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or Common usage convention for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense. Attachment: smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature


  • 16.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 13:52




    Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes?


    [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this]















    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)









    IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make
    something up.









    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead. 









    Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship?









    2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.









    This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do.









    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem)









    Better definitions in the specs?









    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was
    seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim
    Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable









    I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it?









    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.









    This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid
    it.









    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.









    Require indicator pattern.








    What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0?


    For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a
    new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”.


    John




    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs





    The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong. 


    Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way.



    On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote:




    There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/


    If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled.


    Thank you.
    -Mark








    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs





    I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide.


    Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog.


    Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it.



    On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote:



    I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and
    then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.
     However this rarely lead to them making "useful" STIX however at the first redo. 




    A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates...
    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)
    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead. 
    2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.
    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem)
    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was
    seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim
    Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable
    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.
    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.




    Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or "Common usage convention" for STIX 1.x.

    -Mark











    Mark Clancy
    Chief Executive Officer
    SOLTRA     An
    FS-ISAC and DTCC Company
    +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823
    626 535   UK  mobile
    mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com
     
    One organization's
    incident becomes everyone's defense.


























  • 17.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 17:13
    I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary.  I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently doing something similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship and link indicators to threat actors that way.  I  have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because  I  can ’ t currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either. ( I  do then create the CVE object, but it  isn ’ t then linked to anything, unless  I  happen to have the TTP, which  I  usually don't.) This is would be two more relationships  I  would like to see added.  As far as the indicator/observable problem(s),  I  personally do not see the need to have to do both (though we do because the Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship here, so having both is just cumbersome.  And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of "Wunder, John A." < jwunder@mitre.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes? [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this] 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make something up. 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship? 2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) Better definitions in the specs? 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it? 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid it. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Require indicator pattern. What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0? For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”. John From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong.  Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way. On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote: There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/ If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled. Thank you. -Mark From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide. Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog. Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it. On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote: I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making "useful" STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or "Common usage convention" for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . .


  • 18.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 17:41
    Sarah,  You have some really valid points here...  Especially the issue about title in the indicator.  If this or things like it really should not be there, but they were included just because we could put them in, then maybe they need to be dropped.  John makes some really good points about it too..  If you think sometimes it might have something useful, because it is being abused, then it seems like we have a problem.   I really hope that as we push forward with the Indicator revamp that you and your colleagues will point out all of the places were things do not make sense or where we have gotten them wrong.  Lets make sure STIX 2.0 indicators and their related friends, work the way people need them to work.   Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.   On Feb 5, 2016, at 10:12, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > wrote: I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary.  I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently doing something similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship and link indicators to threat actors that way.  I  have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because  I  can ’ t currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either. ( I  do then create the CVE object, but it  isn ’ t then linked to anything, unless  I  happen to have the TTP, which  I  usually don't.) This is would be two more relationships  I  would like to see added.  As far as the indicator/observable problem(s),  I  personally do not see the need to have to do both (though we do because the Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship here, so having both is just cumbersome.  And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Wunder, John A. < jwunder@mitre.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes? [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this] 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make something up. 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship? 2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) Better definitions in the specs? 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it? 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid it. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Require indicator pattern. What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0? For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”. John From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong.  Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way. On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote: There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/ If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled. Thank you. -Mark From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide. Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog. Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it. On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote: I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making useful STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or Common usage convention for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . . Attachment: signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail


  • 19.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 17:55
    on the 3a comment. I should add when I asked about this the reason they did it  is some of their customers wanted to purge out "old" Indicator/Observable data.  If you link a new STIX object to an old one and then you purge old ones the linkage breaks.  (I would argue that is a bad practice if you face certain types of Threat Actors anyway, but the customer is always right. ) What it does do for a CTI Spec however is go to the time stamp problem in that when an object is created it gets a time stamp, but should it get a new one for the last time it was "linked" to another object? So phishing as a TTP is like a decade plus old, but the Indicators for a specific phish just touched that TTP so miscreants must still be using it so don't age it out... -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400 office +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile     +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense.   From: cti@lists.oasis-open.org <cti@lists.oasis-open.org> on behalf of Jordan, Bret <bret.jordan@bluecoat.com> Sent: Friday, February 5, 2016 12:41 PM To: Sarah Kelley Cc: cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs   Sarah,  You have some really valid points here...  Especially the issue about title in the indicator.  If this or things like it really should not be there, but they were included just because we "could" put them in, then maybe they need to be dropped.  John makes some really good points about it too..  If you think sometimes it might have something useful, because it is being abused, then it seems like we have a problem.   I really hope that as we push forward with the Indicator revamp that you and your colleagues will point out all of the places were things do not make sense or where we have gotten them wrong.  Lets make sure STIX 2.0 indicators and their related friends, work the way people need them to work.   Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."  On Feb 5, 2016, at 10:12, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > wrote: I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary.  I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently doing something similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship and link indicators to threat actors that way.  I  have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because  I  can ’ t currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either. ( I  do then create the CVE object, but it  isn ’ t then linked to anything, unless  I  happen to have the TTP, which  I  usually don't.) This is would be two more relationships  I  would like to see added.  As far as the indicator/observable problem(s),  I  personally do not see the need to have to do both (though we do because the Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship here, so having both is just cumbersome.  And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of "Wunder, John A." < jwunder@mitre.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes? [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this] 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make something up. 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship? 2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) Better definitions in the specs? 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it? 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid it. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Require indicator pattern. What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0? For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”. John From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong.  Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way. On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote: There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/ If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled. Thank you. -Mark From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide. Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog. Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it. On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote: I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making "useful" STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or "Common usage convention" for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . .


  • 20.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 18:09






    Sarah, I support the relationship object creating relationships to any object type, for the same reasons you put in your message! We should not try to force people to use relationships the way we see fit within the spec. If we limit users abilities to
    create relationships, then people will just move to proprietary products that don’t implement standards.






    > And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood
    its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort. 



    The indicator could contain a little more context than just the observable :) And it should. I support Mr Wunder’s approach of either making the title field required or removing it. 




    Aharon






    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 12:12 PM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs







    I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary. 




    I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently doing something similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns
    that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship and link indicators to threat actors that way. 




    I  have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because  I  can ’ t
    currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either. ( I  do then create the CVE object, but it  isn ’ t
    then linked to anything, unless  I  happen to have the TTP, which  I  usually don't.) This is would be two more relationships  I  would
    like to see added. 


    As far as the indicator/observable problem(s),  I  personally do not see the need to have to do both (though we do because the
    Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship here, so having both is just cumbersome. 


    And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve
    never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication
    of effort. 










    Sarah Kelley

    Senior CERT Analyst

    Center for Internet Security (CIS)
    Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC)
    Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
    1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC)
    Email:  cert@cisecurity.org
    www.cisecurity.org
    Follow us @CISecurity











    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of "Wunder, John A." < jwunder@mitre.org >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM
    To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs






    Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes?


    [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this]















    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)









    IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make
    something up.









    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead. 









    Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship?









    2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.









    This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do.









    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem)









    Better definitions in the specs?









    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was
    seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim
    Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable









    I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it?









    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.









    This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid
    it.









    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.









    Require indicator pattern.








    What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0?


    For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a
    new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”.


    John




    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs





    The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong. 


    Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way.



    On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote:




    There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/


    If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled.


    Thank you.
    -Mark








    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs





    I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide.


    Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog.


    Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it.



    On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote:



    I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and
    then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.
     However this rarely lead to them making "useful" STIX however at the first redo. 




    A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates...
    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)
    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead. 
    2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.
    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem)
    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was
    seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim
    Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable
    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.
    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.




    Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or "Common usage convention" for STIX 1.x.

    -Mark











    Mark Clancy
    Chief Executive Officer
    SOLTRA     An
    FS-ISAC and DTCC Company
    +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823
    626 535   UK  mobile
    mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com
     
    One organization's
    incident becomes everyone's defense.





















    ...


    This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify
    the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.
    . . .








  • 21.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 18:19
    +1 on both points Aharon.  Point 1 is a good sanity check, and it is important to remember that just because there is a standard somewhere by some standards body does not mean it will be used or adopted.  Lets make STIX easy to use and easy to write tools for, so that it will actually be used everywhere.  Lets not overly restrict things that we do not fully understand.  Lets focus on what we know, and do it really well.   Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.   On Feb 5, 2016, at 11:08, Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com > wrote: Sarah, I support the relationship object creating relationships to any object type, for the same reasons you put in your message! We should not try to force people to use relationships the way we see fit within the spec. If we limit users abilities to create relationships, then people will just move to proprietary products that don’t implement standards. > And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  The indicator could contain a little more context than just the observable :) And it should. I support Mr Wunder’s approach of either making the title field required or removing it.  Aharon From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 12:12 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary.  I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently doing something similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship and link indicators to threat actors that way.  I  have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because  I  can ’ t currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either. ( I  do then create the CVE object, but it  isn ’ t then linked to anything, unless  I  happen to have the TTP, which  I  usually don't.) This is would be two more relationships  I  would like to see added.  As far as the indicator/observable problem(s),  I  personally do not see the need to have to do both (though we do because the Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship here, so having both is just cumbersome.  And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Wunder, John A. < jwunder@mitre.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes? [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this] 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make something up. 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship? 2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) Better definitions in the specs? 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it? 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid it. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Require indicator pattern. What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0? For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”. John From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong.  Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way. On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote: There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/ If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled. Thank you. -Mark From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide. Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog. Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it. On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote: I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making useful STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or Common usage convention for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . . Attachment: signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail


  • 22.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 20:25
    I'm just going to put it out there that if title is made mandatory, the most likely outcome is you will end up with a lot of garbage-ish auto generated titles. Sent from IBM Verse Jordan, Bret --- Re: [cti] Quality of the specs --- From: "Jordan, Bret" <bret.jordan@bluecoat.com> To: "Aharon Chernin" <achernin@soltra.com> Cc: "Sarah Kelley" <Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org>, cti@lists.oasis-open.org Date: Fri, Feb 5, 2016 2:19 PM Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs +1 on both points Aharon.  Point 1 is a good sanity check, and it is important to remember that just because there is a standard somewhere by some standards body does not mean it will be used or adopted.  Lets make STIX easy to use and easy to write tools for, so that it will actually be used everywhere.  Lets not overly restrict things that we do not fully understand.  Lets focus on what we know, and do it really well.   Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.   On Feb 5, 2016, at 11:08, Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com > wrote: Sarah, I support the relationship object creating relationships to any object type, for the same reasons you put in your message! We should not try to force people to use relationships the way we see fit within the spec. If we limit users abilities to create relationships, then people will just move to proprietary products that don’t implement standards. > And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  The indicator could contain a little more context than just the observable :) And it should. I support Mr Wunder’s approach of either making the title field required or removing it.  Aharon From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 12:12 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary.  I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently doing something similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship and link indicators to threat actors that way.  I  have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because  I  can ’ t currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either. ( I  do then create the CVE object, but it  isn ’ t then linked to anything, unless  I  happen to have the TTP, which  I  usually don't.) This is would be two more relationships  I  would like to see added.  As far as the indicator/observable problem(s),  I  personally do not see the need to have to do both (though we do because the Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship here, so having both is just cumbersome.  And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Wunder, John A. < jwunder@mitre.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes? [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this] 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make something up. 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship? 2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) Better definitions in the specs? 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it? 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid it. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Require indicator pattern. What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0? For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”. John From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong.  Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way. On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote: There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/ If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled. Thank you. -Mark From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide. Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog. Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it. On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote: I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making useful STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or Common usage convention for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . .


  • 23.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 20:39





    I would agree to some degree though I do not believe we can/should remove it.
    I believe that Mark is far from unique in his desire to see this property consistently populated. Several other current users have talked about how they feel this field is useful and plan to use it.


    That is completely aside from the desire to treat top-level objects consistently.


    sean









    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 3:24 PM
    To: "Jordan, Bret" < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com >
    Cc: Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com >, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org "
    < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs




    I'm just going to put it out there that if "title" is made mandatory, the most likely outcome is you will end up with a lot of garbage-ish auto
    generated titles.



    Sent from IBM Verse


    Jordan, Bret --- Re: [cti] Quality of the specs ---





    From:
    "Jordan, Bret" < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com >


    To:
    "Aharon Chernin" < achernin@soltra.com >


    Cc:
    "Sarah Kelley" < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >,
    cti@lists.oasis-open.org


    Date:
    Fri, Feb 5, 2016 2:19 PM


    Subject:
    Re: [cti] Quality of the specs






    +1 on both points Aharon.  Point 1 is a good sanity check, and it is important to remember that just because there is a standard "somewhere" by some "standards body" does not mean it will be used or adopted.  Lets make STIX easy to use and easy to write tools
    for, so that it will actually be used everywhere.  Lets not overly restrict things that we do not fully understand.  Lets focus on what we know, and do it really well.  











    Thanks,


    Bret











    Bret Jordan CISSP

    Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO

    Blue Coat Systems

    PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
    "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg." 











    On Feb 5, 2016, at 11:08, Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com > wrote:






    Sarah, I support the relationship object creating relationships to any object type, for the same reasons you put in your message! We should not try to force people to use relationships the way we see fit within the spec. If we limit users abilities
    to create relationships, then people will just move to proprietary products that don’t implement standards.






    > And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve
    never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like
    duplication of effort. 



    The indicator could contain a little more context than just the observable :) And it should. I support Mr Wunder’s approach of either making the title field required or removing it. 




    Aharon






    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 12:12 PM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs






    I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary. 


    I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently doing something
    similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship and link
    indicators to threat actors that way. 



    I  have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because  I  can ’ t
    currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either. ( I  do then create the CVE object, but it  isn ’ t
    then linked to anything, unless  I  happen to have the TTP, which  I  usually don't.)
    This is would be two more relationships  I  would like to see added. 


    As far as the indicator/observable problem(s),  I  personally do not see the need to have to do both (though
    we do because the Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship here, so having both is just cumbersome. 


    And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve
    never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like
    duplication of effort. 






    Sarah Kelley
    Senior CERT Analyst

    Center for Internet Security (CIS)
    Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC)
    Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
    1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC)
    Email:  cert@cisecurity.org
    www.cisecurity.org
    Follow us @CISecurity









    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of "Wunder, John A." < jwunder@mitre.org >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM
    To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs






    Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes?


    [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this]















    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)









    IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so
    they need to make something up.









    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead. 









    Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship?









    2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.









    This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed
    to do.









    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem)









    Better definitions in the specs?









    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was
    seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim
    Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable









    I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it?









    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.









    This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator)
    I think we can avoid it.









    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.









    Require indicator pattern.








    What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0?


    For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for
    “things not to do in STIX 1.2”.


    John




    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs





    The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong. 


    Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way.



    On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote:




    There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/


    If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled.


    Thank you.
    -Mark








    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs





    I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide.


    Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog.


    Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it.



    On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote:



    I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and
    then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.
     However this rarely lead to them making "useful" STIX however at the first redo. 




    A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates...
    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)
    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead. 
    2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.
    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem)
    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was
    seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim
    Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable
    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.
    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.




    Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or "Common usage convention" for STIX 1.x.

    -Mark











    Mark Clancy
    Chief Executive Officer
    SOLTRA     An
    FS-ISAC and DTCC Company
    +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823
    626 535   UK  mobile
    mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com
     
    One organization's
    incident becomes everyone's defense.





















    ...


    This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify
    the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.
    . . .

















  • 24.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 20:44
    I would love to hear from some of these current users on how and why they think the field is useful..    I would suggest that we have a design goal to not force TLOs to look and feel the same.  If they happen to end up that way do to real need, then great.  But lets not force a field on one TLO just because it is valid in 4 others. Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.   On Feb 5, 2016, at 13:38, Barnum, Sean D. < sbarnum@mitre.org > wrote: I would agree to some degree though I do not believe we can/should remove it. I believe that Mark is far from unique in his desire to see this property consistently populated. Several other current users have talked about how they feel this field is useful and plan to use it. That is completely aside from the desire to treat top-level objects consistently. sean From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 3:24 PM To: Jordan, Bret < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com > Cc: Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com >, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I'm just going to put it out there that if title is made mandatory, the most likely outcome is you will end up with a lot of garbage-ish auto generated titles. Sent from IBM Verse Jordan, Bret --- Re: [cti] Quality of the specs --- From: Jordan, Bret < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com > To: Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com > Cc: Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org Date: Fri, Feb 5, 2016 2:19 PM Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs +1 on both points Aharon.  Point 1 is a good sanity check, and it is important to remember that just because there is a standard somewhere by some standards body does not mean it will be used or adopted.  Lets make STIX easy to use and easy to write tools for, so that it will actually be used everywhere.  Lets not overly restrict things that we do not fully understand.  Lets focus on what we know, and do it really well.   Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.   On Feb 5, 2016, at 11:08, Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com > wrote: Sarah, I support the relationship object creating relationships to any object type, for the same reasons you put in your message! We should not try to force people to use relationships the way we see fit within the spec. If we limit users abilities to create relationships, then people will just move to proprietary products that don’t implement standards. > And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  The indicator could contain a little more context than just the observable :) And it should. I support Mr Wunder’s approach of either making the title field required or removing it.  Aharon From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 12:12 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary.  I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently doing something similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship and link indicators to threat actors that way.  I  have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because  I  can ’ t currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either. ( I  do then create the CVE object, but it  isn ’ t then linked to anything, unless  I  happen to have the TTP, which  I  usually don't.) This is would be two more relationships  I  would like to see added.  As far as the indicator/observable problem(s),  I  personally do not see the need to have to do both (though we do because the Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship here, so having both is just cumbersome.  And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Wunder, John A. < jwunder@mitre.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes? [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this] 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make something up. 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship? 2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) Better definitions in the specs? 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it? 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid it. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Require indicator pattern. What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0? For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”. John From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong.  Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way. On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote: There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/ If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled. Thank you. -Mark From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide. Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog. Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it. On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote: I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making useful STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or Common usage convention for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . . Attachment: signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail


  • 25.  RE: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 21:45




    Is more stringent validation an option for specific communities?  If we make Title an optional field, but a particular community wants it to be mandatory, that’s
    a validation rule change.  Optionality in the spec doesn’t preclude that.  No need to impose that requirement as a whole.
     


    From: cti@lists.oasis-open.org [mailto:cti@lists.oasis-open.org]
    On Behalf Of Jordan, Bret
    Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 3:44 PM
    To: Barnum, Sean D.
    Cc: Jason Keirstead; Aharon Chernin; Sarah Kelley; cti@lists.oasis-open.org
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs


     
    I would love to hear from some of these "current users" on how and why they think the field is useful..   

     


    I would suggest that we have a design goal to not force TLOs to look and feel the same.  If they happen to end up that way do to real need, then great.  But lets not force a field on one TLO just because it is valid in 4 others.







     


    Thanks,


     


    Bret



     


     


     



    Bret Jordan CISSP

    Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO


    Blue Coat Systems



    PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050


    "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg." 









     



    On Feb 5, 2016, at 13:38, Barnum, Sean D. < sbarnum@mitre.org > wrote:

     





    I would agree to some degree though I do not believe we can/should remove it.


    I believe that Mark is far from unique in his desire to see this property consistently populated. Several other current users have talked about how they feel this field is
    useful and plan to use it.


     


    That is completely aside from the desire to treat top-level objects consistently.


     


    sean




     


    From:
    < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 3:24 PM
    To: "Jordan, Bret" < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com >
    Cc: Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com >, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs


     



    I'm just going to put it out there that if "title" is made mandatory, the most likely outcome is you will end up with a lot of garbage-ish
    auto generated titles.



    Sent from IBM Verse


    Jordan, Bret --- Re: [cti] Quality of the specs ---



     




    From:


    "Jordan, Bret" < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com >




    To:


    "Aharon Chernin" < achernin@soltra.com >




    Cc:


    "Sarah Kelley" < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >,
    cti@lists.oasis-open.org




    Date:


    Fri, Feb 5, 2016 2:19 PM




    Subject:


    Re: [cti] Quality of the specs







     

    +1 on both points Aharon.  Point 1 is a good sanity check, and it is important to remember that just because there is a standard "somewhere" by some "standards body" does
    not mean it will be used or adopted.  Lets make STIX easy to use and easy to write tools for, so that it will actually be used everywhere.  Lets not overly restrict things that we do not fully understand.  Lets focus on what we know, and do it really well.
     







     


    Thanks,


     


    Bret



     


     


     



    Bret Jordan CISSP


    Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO


    Blue Coat Systems



    PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050


    "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg." 









     



    On Feb 5, 2016, at 11:08, Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com > wrote:

     






    Sarah, I support the relationship object creating relationships to any object type, for the same reasons you put in your message! We should not try to force people to use
    relationships the way we see fit within the spec. If we limit users abilities to create relationships, then people will just move to proprietary products that don’t implement standards.





     



    > And as to the Title field on indicators, I’ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if
    we’re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort. 



     


    The indicator could contain a little more context than just the observable :) And it should. I support Mr Wunder’s approach of either making the title field required or removing
    it. 


     


     


    Aharon


     


     


    From:
    < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 12:12 PM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs


     





    I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary. 


     


    I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently
    doing something similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship
    and link indicators to threat actors that way. 



     


    I have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because I can’t currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either.
    (I do then create the CVE object, but it  isn’t then linked to anything, unless I happen to have the TTP, which I usually don't.) This is would be two more relationships I would like to see added. 


     


    As far as the indicator/observable problem(s), I personally do not see the need to have to do both (though we do because the Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship
    here, so having both is just cumbersome. 


     


    And as to the Title field on indicators, I’ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we’re
    putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort. 


     


     


     


    Sarah Kelley


    Senior CERT Analyst



    Center for Internet Security (CIS)


    Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC)


    Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)


    1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC)


    Email:  cert@cisecurity.org


    www.cisecurity.org


    Follow us @CISecurity



     




     


    From:
    < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of "Wunder, John A." < jwunder@mitre.org >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM
    To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs


     





    Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes?


     


    [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this]


     














    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)










    IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in
    there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make something up.










    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat
    Actor object instead. 










    Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit
    “indicated actor” relationship?










    2a.    ...or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.










    This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in
    a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do.










    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general
    instance problem)










    Better definitions in the specs?










    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back
    to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators
    linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable










    I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them
    as much as possible to do it?










    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.










    This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns
    (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid it.










    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.










    Require indicator pattern.







    What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0?


     


    For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than
    our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”.


     


    John


     


    From:
    < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs


     



    The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong. 


     


    Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way.


     



    On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote:

     




    There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/


     


    If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled.


     


    Thank you.


    -Mark



     


    From:
    < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs


     



    I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide.


     


    Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog.


     


    Start now because STIX
    will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it.

     



    On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote:

     



    I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used
    to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid
    STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making "useful" STIX however at the first redo. 


     


     


    A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates...


    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)


    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat
    Actor object instead. 


    2a.    ...or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.


    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general
    instance problem)


    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back
    to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators
    linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable


    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.


    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.


     


     


    Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or "Common usage convention" for STIX 1.x.


    -Mark


     


     


     


     





    Mark Clancy


    Chief Executive Officer


    SOLTRA     An
    FS-ISAC and DTCC Company


    +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile      +44 7823
    626 535   UK  mobile


    mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com


     


    One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense.
















     




    ...


    This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution
    or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

    . . .






     







     







  • 26.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 22:09
    Is it that the folks not populating the Title field not understanding how it could be useful, or is it because it is not useful for them? While it is enticing to say the Title field should be optional, if it really is generally useful, interoperability will be greatly enhanced if we make it a mandatory field. Conversely, if it is not generally useful and we are looking at 50-50 or 60-40 non-use:use, then OK, it is really optional. On Feb 5, 2016, at 4:44 PM, Coderre, Robert < rcoderre@verisign.com > wrote: Is more stringent validation an option for specific communities?  If we make Title an optional field, but a particular community wants it to be mandatory, that’s a validation rule change.  Optionality in the spec doesn’t preclude that.  No need to impose that requirement as a whole.   From:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org [ mailto:cti@lists.oasis-open.org ]   On Behalf Of   Jordan, Bret Sent:   Friday, February 05, 2016 3:44 PM To:   Barnum, Sean D. Cc:   Jason Keirstead; Aharon Chernin; Sarah Kelley; cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject:   Re: [cti] Quality of the specs   I would love to hear from some of these current users on how and why they think the field is useful..      I would suggest that we have a design goal to not force TLOs to look and feel the same.  If they happen to end up that way do to real need, then great.  But lets not force a field on one TLO just because it is valid in 4 others.   Thanks,   Bret       Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.     On Feb 5, 2016, at 13:38, Barnum, Sean D. < sbarnum@mitre.org > wrote:   I would agree to some degree though I do not believe we can/should remove it. I believe that Mark is far from unique in his desire to see this property consistently populated. Several other current users have talked about how they feel this field is useful and plan to use it.   That is completely aside from the desire to treat top-level objects consistently.   sean   From:   < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com > Date:   Friday, February 5, 2016 at 3:24 PM To:   Jordan, Bret < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com > Cc:   Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com >, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject:   Re: [cti] Quality of the specs   I'm just going to put it out there that if title is made mandatory, the most likely outcome is you will end up with a lot of garbage-ish auto generated titles.   Sent from IBM Verse Jordan, Bret --- Re: [cti] Quality of the specs ---   From: Jordan, Bret < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com > To: Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com > Cc: Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >,   cti@lists.oasis-open.org Date: Fri, Feb 5, 2016 2:19 PM Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs   +1 on both points Aharon.  Point 1 is a good sanity check, and it is important to remember that just because there is a standard somewhere by some standards body does not mean it will be used or adopted.  Lets make STIX easy to use and easy to write tools for, so that it will actually be used everywhere.  Lets not overly restrict things that we do not fully understand.  Lets focus on what we know, and do it really well.     Thanks,   Bret       Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.     On Feb 5, 2016, at 11:08, Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com > wrote:   Sarah, I support the relationship object creating relationships to any object type, for the same reasons you put in your message! We should not try to force people to use relationships the way we see fit within the spec. If we limit users abilities to create relationships, then people will just move to proprietary products that don’t implement standards.   > And as to the Title field on indicators, I’ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we’re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.    The indicator could contain a little more context than just the observable :) And it should. I support Mr Wunder’s approach of either making the title field required or removing it.      Aharon     From:   < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Date:   Friday, February 5, 2016 at 12:12 PM To:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject:   Re: [cti] Quality of the specs   I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary.    I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently doing something similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship and link indicators to threat actors that way.    I have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because I can’t currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either. (I do then create the CVE object, but it  isn’t then linked to anything, unless I happen to have the TTP, which I usually don't.) This is would be two more relationships I would like to see added.    As far as the indicator/observable problem(s), I personally do not see the need to have to do both (though we do because the Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship here, so having both is just cumbersome.    And as to the Title field on indicators, I’ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we’re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.        Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity     From:   < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Wunder, John A. < jwunder@mitre.org > Date:   Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM To:   Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject:   Re: [cti] Quality of the specs   Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes?   [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this]   1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make something up. 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship? 2a.    ...or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) Better definitions in the specs? 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it? 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid it. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Require indicator pattern. What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0?   For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”.   John   From:   < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date:   Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM To:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject:   Re: [cti] Quality of the specs   The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong.    Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way.   On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote:   There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/   If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled.   Thank you. -Mark   From:   < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date:   Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM To:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject:   Re: [cti] Quality of the specs   I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide.   Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog.   Start now because STIX   will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it.   On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote:   I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making useful STIX however at the first redo.      A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.    ...or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.     Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or Common usage convention for STIX 1.x. -Mark         Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile      +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense.   ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.   . . . Attachment: smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature


  • 27.  RE: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 22:21
    Attachment: smime.p7m Description: S/MIME encrypted message


  • 28.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-09-2016 21:27
    Keeping title as optional and removing it are two very different things. There are many instances where there won't be a human at the keyboard to put a title on an indicator. If title is made mandatory, then in those situations the title will be auto generated from the content, and probably not very useful. I do not think indicator title is the same class as TTP information. There are use cases for indicators without human created titles. Sent from IBM Verse Jordan, Bret --- Re: [cti] Quality of the specs --- From: "Jordan, Bret" <bret.jordan@bluecoat.com> To: "Barnum, Sean D." <sbarnum@mitre.org> Cc: "Jason Keirstead" <Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com>, "Aharon Chernin" <achernin@soltra.com>, "Sarah Kelley" <Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org>, cti@lists.oasis-open.org Date: Fri, Feb 5, 2016 12:44 PM Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would love to hear from some of these current users on how and why they think the field is useful..    I would suggest that we have a design goal to not force TLOs to look and feel the same.  If they happen to end up that way do to real need, then great.  But lets not force a field on one TLO just because it is valid in 4 others. Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.   On Feb 5, 2016, at 13:38, Barnum, Sean D. < sbarnum@mitre.org > wrote: I would agree to some degree though I do not believe we can/should remove it. I believe that Mark is far from unique in his desire to see this property consistently populated. Several other current users have talked about how they feel this field is useful and plan to use it. That is completely aside from the desire to treat top-level objects consistently. sean From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 3:24 PM To: Jordan, Bret < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com > Cc: Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com >, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I'm just going to put it out there that if title is made mandatory, the most likely outcome is you will end up with a lot of garbage-ish auto generated titles. Sent from IBM Verse Jordan, Bret --- Re: [cti] Quality of the specs --- From: Jordan, Bret < bret.jordan@bluecoat.com > To: Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com > Cc: Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org Date: Fri, Feb 5, 2016 2:19 PM Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs +1 on both points Aharon.  Point 1 is a good sanity check, and it is important to remember that just because there is a standard somewhere by some standards body does not mean it will be used or adopted.  Lets make STIX easy to use and easy to write tools for, so that it will actually be used everywhere.  Lets not overly restrict things that we do not fully understand.  Lets focus on what we know, and do it really well.   Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.   On Feb 5, 2016, at 11:08, Aharon Chernin < achernin@soltra.com > wrote: Sarah, I support the relationship object creating relationships to any object type, for the same reasons you put in your message! We should not try to force people to use relationships the way we see fit within the spec. If we limit users abilities to create relationships, then people will just move to proprietary products that don’t implement standards. > And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  The indicator could contain a little more context than just the observable :) And it should. I support Mr Wunder’s approach of either making the title field required or removing it.  Aharon From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 12:12 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would agree that a lot of the problem of putting things in the wrong TLO is likely due to a lack of ability to create the links/relationships that are necessary.  I would +1000 the need to be able to link indicators directly to threat actors. This one missing relationship has caused more issues than any other for us. We are currently doing something similar to what was described below (on purpose). We create fake campaigns that are named the same as (and sometimes even contain the exact same information as) a threat actor just so we can create a threat actor -> Campaign -> indicator relationship and link indicators to threat actors that way.  I  have also put CVE information directly into the description field of a threat actor or a campaign because  I  can ’ t currently link CVEs directly to either of these TLOs either. ( I  do then create the CVE object, but it  isn ’ t then linked to anything, unless  I  happen to have the TTP, which  I  usually don't.) This is would be two more relationships  I  would like to see added.  As far as the indicator/observable problem(s),  I  personally do not see the need to have to do both (though we do because the Soltra Edge tool makes us). We use a 1-to-1 relationship here, so having both is just cumbersome.  And as to the Title field on indicators,  I ’ ve never really understood its purpose. We use it, but the title field of the indicator is just the indicator itself. So if we ’ re putting in a domain, the title will just be the domain name, which just seems like duplication of effort.  Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Wunder, John A. < jwunder@mitre.org > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 8:51 AM To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes? [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this] 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make something up. 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit “indicated actor” relationship? 2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) Better definitions in the specs? 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them as much as possible to do it? 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid it. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Require indicator pattern. What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0? For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”. John From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went wrong.  Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way. On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote: There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/ If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests) would be handled. Thank you. -Mark From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide. Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog. Start now because STIX will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it. On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote: I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making useful STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or Common usage convention for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments. . . .


  • 29.  RE: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-07-2016 05:27




    Hi John,
     
    “3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back
    to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators
    linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable
    I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them
    as much as possible to do it?”
     
    I think we coulod go a long way towards this by separating the TTP objects into its various objects (attack-pattern’ being one of them)
    and then creating an attack-pattern library that records each CAPEC attack pattern Object ID. Implementors can then all use the centrally stored attack-pattern library, and we can ensure that CAPEC attack pattern has a single global objectID that all implementations
    will use.
     
    For the other parts of the TTP object (i.e. exploits, malware , etc) we’ll still have the problem that you and Marc have brought up,
    but with the ability to share relationships with third-party objects we should be able to share the TTP objects more easily at a global level. I would hope that in the same way people start referring to certain malware with names such as Dridex, we’ll start
    all linking our malware and exploits to certain ‘popular’ objects within STIX.
     
    The difficulty will be in how to surface that ‘popular name’ up to the user interface for the user to select…
     
    Cheers
     

    Terry MacDonald
    Senior STIX Subject Matter Expert
    SOLTRA   An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company
    +61 (407) 203 206
    terry@soltra.com
     

     


    From: cti@lists.oasis-open.org [mailto:cti@lists.oasis-open.org]
    On Behalf Of Wunder, John A.
    Sent: Saturday, 6 February 2016 12:52 AM
    To: Eric Burger <Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu>; cti@lists.oasis-open.org
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs


     


    Thinking forward to STIX 2.0, how would we address Mark C's’s concerns in STIX 2.0 to make sure we don’t repeat the same mistakes?


     


    [Sorry for the inevitable mangling of formatting that Outlook for mac will do to this]


     














    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)










    IMO title fields should either be absent or required. Having optional title fields makes it hard for consumers because there MIGHT be useful information in there
    that they need to display/track, but might not so they need to make something up.










    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor
    object instead. 










    Part of this is probably just growing pains. Part of it is probably that you can’t currently go directly from indicator to threat actor. Should we add an explicit
    “indicated actor” relationship?










    2a.    ...or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.










    This is probably also growing pains, but maybe our move to separate TTP objects will help? Maybe we can also (in the spec) document defined relationships in a
    way that makes it very clear exactly what you’re supposed to do.










    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance
    problem)










    Better definitions in the specs?










    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to
    the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators
    linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable










    I don’t really have any recommendations here…anyone on the implementor side have advice? How can we make sure that people do this, or at least encourage them
    as much as possible to do it?










    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.










    This could be fine if they were creating observable instances. But, in STIX 2.0, by having explicit separation between instances (Observations) and patterns (non-TLOs
    that must appear nested within an indicator) I think we can avoid it.










    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.










    Require indicator pattern.







    What else? Are there other problems in 1.2 that we can try to head off in 2.0?


     


    For 1.2, these are things we tried to address via the idioms. They have examples and descriptions for most of these topics. Will people be more likely to read a
    top 5 than our giant list? It would be easy enough to create a new page for “things not to do in STIX 1.2”.


     


    John


     


    From:
    < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Friday, February 5, 2016 at 7:17 AM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs


     



    The suggested practices page is a good start for an implementor’s guide. However, looking at Mark C.’s list, I do not think anyone would easily see where they went
    wrong. 

     


    Maybe a version or section on the page that reads like the SANS 20? Mark C.’s top five, with their corresponding “right ways” would go a long way.


     



    On Feb 5, 2016, at 7:00 AM, Mark Davidson < mdavidson@soltra.com > wrote:

     




    There is a place where suggested practices live:  http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/suggested-practices/


     


    If this maps to what you are thinking, I’d recommend adding/commenting on the suggested practices. MITRE can comment on how contributions (e.g., pull requests)
    would be handled.


     


    Thank you.


    -Mark



     


    From:
    < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >, Eric Burger < ewb25@georgetown.edu > on behalf of Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 11:19 PM
    To: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs


     



    I would offer we start with a FAQ (on a wiki) that eventually (but not yet!) becomes the bulk of an implementor’s guide.


     


    Not yet because the tail will start wagging the dog.


     


    Start now because STIX
    will  get a black eye if people are saying they cannot exchange data with it.

     



    On Feb 4, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote:

     



    I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script
    they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically
    valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making "useful" STIX however at the first redo. 


     


     


    A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates...


    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)


    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to
    a Threat Actor object instead. 


    2a.    ...or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.


    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case
    vs general instance problem)


    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really
    link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X,
    with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable


    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.


    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.


     


     


    Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or "Common usage convention" for STIX 1.x.


    -Mark


     


     


     


     





    Mark Clancy


    Chief Executive Officer


    SOLTRA     An
    FS-ISAC and DTCC Company


    +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile      +44 7823
    626 535   UK  mobile


    mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com


     


    One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense.
















     









  • 30.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 17:34
    It seems like all of this can and will be fixed as we improve the tooling.  Thanks, Bret Bret Jordan CISSP Director of Security Architecture and Standards Office of the CTO Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg.   On Feb 4, 2016, at 15:21, Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com > wrote: I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making useful STIX however at the first redo.  A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates... 1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this) 2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead.  2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object. 3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem) 3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable 4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them. 5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description. Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or Common usage convention for STIX 1.x. -Mark Mark Clancy Chief Executive Officer SOLTRA     An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company +1.813.470.2400   office     +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile       +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile mclancy@soltra.com     soltra.com   One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense.   From:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org   < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Sent:   Thursday, February 4, 2016 9:02 AM To:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org Subject:   Re: [cti] Quality of the specs   Unfortunately, I can’t say with 100% certainty. The STIX documents were sent via email, so I don’t have a clue what created the documents from a tool perspective.  I feel like some of it is that people are just taking liberties with the language. For example, one error I just got when trying to validate a file said: “The value ‘Domain Name’ is not an element of the set {‘FQDN’, ‘TLD’}” This says to me, and I could just be wrong, that someone implemented something that didn’t like the options of FQDN or TLD, so they just put Domain Name there instead.  However, some of the problems might be just an issue reading/interpreting the specs. I have also seen the error: “Element ‘{ http://stix.mitre.org/stix-1 }Handling’ is not a member of…” however “{ http://stix.mitre.org/Indicator-2}Handling ” is one of the options in the list. Since I’m an analyst and not a spec writer or a tool developer, this error doesn’t mean much to me, but it might mean something to others.  Sorry I can’t provide more specifics, but I really don’t know how these documents were generated.  Sarah Kelley Senior CERT Analyst Center for Internet Security (CIS) Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC) Email:  cert@cisecurity.org www.cisecurity.org Follow us @CISecurity From:   < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com > Date:   Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:48 AM To:   Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > Cc:   Sarah Kelley < sarah.kelley@cisecurity.org >, cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Subject:   Re: [cti] Quality of the specs Furthermore - are the people creating this STIX using a tool provided by a vendor, or crafting it by hand (or using home grown tools). - Jason Keirstead STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems www.ibm.com/security     www.securityintelligence.com Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown   <graycol.gif> Eric Burger ---02/04/2016 07:20:43 AM---In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs a From:   Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu > To:   Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > Cc:   cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > Date:   02/04/2016 07:20 AM Subject:   [cti] Quality of the specs Sent by:   < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs are wrong, or the validator is wrong? On Feb 2, 2016, at 2:53 PM, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > wrote: Can I make a request that every training that takes place regarding STIX/TAXII/CybOX specifically mention/provide training on the STIX validator? We have had several different instances where people attempt to share information with us in STIX format, but the STIX doesn’t validate so we can’t actually use what they’re sending us. ... This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.   . . . Attachment: signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail


  • 31.  Re: [cti] Quality of the specs

    Posted 02-05-2016 17:49





    +1
    I feel your pain Mark. ;-)


    sean









    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Mark Clancy < mclancy@soltra.com >
    Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 5:21 PM
    To: Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs






    I have seen a bunch of this equally across government sources, from commercial sources, and individual threat analysts and they were taking some script they used to make CTI in home grown formats and then did a swag at turning the CTI data into STIX. They
    did not know about the STIX validator. When I talked to them about the validator they went back and tweaked their home grown script until it made technically valid STIX at least as the validator is concerned.  However this rarely lead to them making "useful"
    STIX however at the first redo. 




    A few repeat problems I have seen for STIX that validates , but still frustrates...
    1. Not adding titles to Indicators (ok personal pet peeve perhaps, but one of my favorite CTI sources still doesn't do this)
    2. Adding attribution information in a description for an Indicator object or describing Threat Actor as an Indicator object and not creatinglinking to a Threat Actor object instead. 
    2a.     ... or for that matter jamming TTP information in an Indicator description without a TTP object.
    3. Using an Incident Object to describe a TTP or a TTP object to describe an incident. (Is a malware variant an Incident or a TTP specific example/case vs general instance problem)
    3a.  Is each occurrence of a piece of malware that has Indicators/Observables with the same Victim Targeting a new and different TTP or should it really link back to the same TTP object? What I was seeing at one point was each Zeus Trojan targeting customer
    of Bank X getting its own TTP every time there was a new C2 as an Indicator. It really should have been Zeus Trojan TTP with Victim Targeting of bank X, with C2 Indicators linked to the same TTP + Victim Targeting object again and again for each new C2 Indicator/Observable
    4. Creating Observables with no Indicators linked to them.
    5. Creating Indicators with no Observables and having the observable data in the description.




    Maybe we should have  FAQ of common STIX mistakes to avoid or "Common usage convention" for STIX 1.x.

    -Mark











    Mark Clancy
    Chief Executive Officer
    SOLTRA

    An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company
    +1.813.470.2400
    office

    +1.610.659.6671  US  mobile

        +44 7823 626 535   UK  mobile
    mclancy@soltra.com
    soltra.com
     
    One organization's incident becomes everyone's defense.
     








    From:
    cti@lists.oasis-open.org < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >
    Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 9:02 AM
    To: cti@lists.oasis-open.org
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs
     





    Unfortunately, I can’t say with 100% certainty. The STIX documents were sent via email, so I don’t have a clue what created the documents from a tool perspective. 


    I feel like some of it is that people are just taking liberties with the language. For example, one error I just got when trying to validate a file said:


    “The value ‘Domain Name’ is not an element of the set {‘FQDN’, ‘TLD’}”


    This says to me, and I could just be wrong, that someone implemented something that didn’t like the options of FQDN or TLD, so they just put Domain Name there instead. 


    However, some of the problems might be just an issue reading/interpreting the specs. I have also seen the error:


    “Element ‘{ http://stix.mitre.org/stix-1 }Handling’ is not a member of…” however “{ http://stix.mitre.org/Indicator-2}Handling ” is one of the options in the
    list. Since I’m an analyst and not a spec writer or a tool developer, this error doesn’t mean much to me, but it might mean something to others. 


    Sorry I can’t provide more specifics, but I really don’t know how these documents were generated. 









    Sarah Kelley
    Senior CERT Analyst

    Center for Internet Security (CIS)
    Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC)
    Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
    1-866-787-4722 (7×24 SOC)
    Email:  cert@cisecurity.org
    www.cisecurity.org
    Follow us @CISecurity










    From: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org > on behalf of Jason Keirstead < Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com >
    Date: Thursday, February 4, 2016 at 8:48 AM
    To: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    Cc: Sarah Kelley < sarah.kelley@cisecurity.org >, " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Subject: Re: [cti] Quality of the specs





    Furthermore - are the people creating this STIX using a tool provided by a vendor, or crafting it by hand (or using home grown tools).

    -
    Jason Keirstead
    STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems
    www.ibm.com/security www.securityintelligence.com

    Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown


    Eric
    Burger ---02/04/2016 07:20:43 AM---In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs a

    From: Eric Burger < Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu >
    To: Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org >
    Cc: " cti@lists.oasis-open.org " < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >
    Date: 02/04/2016 07:20 AM
    Subject: [cti] Quality of the specs
    Sent by: < cti@lists.oasis-open.org >





    In your experience is it that people are not reading the specs, the specs are ambiguous, the specs are wrong, or the validator is wrong?


    On Feb 2, 2016, at 2:53 PM, Sarah Kelley < Sarah.Kelley@cisecurity.org > wrote:

    Can I make a request that every training that takes place regarding STIX/TAXII/CybOX specifically mention/provide training on the STIX validator? We have had several different instances where people attempt to share information with us
    in STIX format, but the STIX doesn’t validate so we can’t actually use what they’re sending us.





    ...


    This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify
    the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.
    . . .