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Subject: RE: [emergency] CAP and Signatures/Encryption
NIMS sets the doctrine. NRP sets the protocols, structures,
and so on. That is the game.
NIMS says control is local until it is not, then systems
come on line as requested or as directed from the White
House. I don't think they will entertain chaos theory
during an Incident of National Significance.
That means to the best of our ability, we eliminate
variability we can anticipate and put in adaptors where
we can't. I do understand the problems of complexity
and that is why one gets rid of complexity wherever
possible. NIMS specifies a doctrine of local control,
standing systems, and dynamic configuration for a
limited set of control nodes and players. NRP names
the players and the command modes. I don't
think it perfect, but it will be reviewed and amended
yearly. It also has a very short fuse for initialization.
It's a good approach. EDXL and CAP should play very
well in this system.
The Cursor On Target program of the USAF is working
very well because it took command and control down
to the bare bones essentials and spec'd only that.
CAP stays similarly simple. I think this committee
is doing a good job. GJXDM is a bear because it may
be too many things in one package. Likely, someone
needs to review that. Possibly, Mike Daconta and
his folks will do that.
However, they will need a full up exercise somewhere
in the early part of next year of the late part of
this year. The sooner the better. This has to
be a simulation of multiple well-timed and coordinated
but independently executed actions of multiple types.
The SecDef and SecHLS need to tell the commander in
chief how well this thing takes a stressful INS.
len
From: Art Botterell [mailto:acb@incident.com]
Certainly it would be simpler for everyone if civil emergency
management were a determinate command-and-control system... but we
all know it isn't. Particularly in cultures that value things like
individual responsibility and autonomy, home rule, democracy, free
markets and property rights, "command" is necessarily more like
"coordinate," and "control" is often reduced to "cajole" at best.
In fact, thinking about anything beyond very specialized segments of
emergency management in terms of a "system" may be a bit misleading.
There's no single aim point as in classic cybernetics. There's no
consensus on metrics or on the balance between local and overall
optimization. The analogies of grid computing or genetic-algorithm
software development might be closer fits, but even those don't fully
reflect the true complexity of the problem. And that problem isn't
going to change itself to accommodate our technologies.
Of course, the same adaptability and modularity that let us adapt,
improvise and overcome in chaos will help us transition smoothly into
more structured methodologies as they evolve. In the meantime, we
need to strike the best available balance between flexibility and
control.
"We juggle priceless eggs in variable gravity." Metaphors can be a
great help in coming to grips with this sometimes-daunting task...
but we also need to remember that the map is not the territory, nor
is the model the reality.
- Art
At 3:07 PM -0600 1/27/05, Bullard, Claude L (Len) wrote:
>That means a Fed push down to the States with a reference
>architecture. Work in
>some of the BAAs from HSARPA may instigate that.
>
>Simpler is better. The USAF Cursor On Target approach is a good
>one. When one
>has to pull together a system dynamically scaling out from the command to
the
>area command, as each system comes on line and the locus of command shifts,
>the need for quick set ups dominates the need for expressiveness.
>
>The NRP is a good read. They thought it through and have a solid
>plan. I suspect
>that as in most disaster planning, simulations and exercises will be done.
>
>len
>
>